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ELIMINATING INDIAN STEREOTYPES FROM
AMERICAN SOCIETY: CAUSES AND LEGAL AND
SOCIETAL SOLUTIONS
Kim Chandler Johnson* & John Terrence Eck**
1995 World Series Fans were greeted by a billboard, across from
the stadium, which depicted a peace pipe broken in half by a
three-dimensional tomahawk. The billboard read: "There will be
no peace-pipe smoking in Atlanta. Indians beware."***
Introduction
Even in the 1990s, derogatory stereotypes of Native Americans are all
too common. In school textbooks,' film and television productions,
2
literature3 and even children's toys,4 the American Indian is portrayed in a
simplistic way: as a relic of the Wild West frontier days. "We're not
ignorant, savage or subservient," said Indian activist Charles Tripp.5 Tripp,
a Tulsa attorney and Cherokee Indian, spoke at an Oklahoma conference
which was held the day after Thanksgiving to celebrate 1992 as the
"International Year of the Indigenous People."6 He urged Indians and other
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of Oklahoma College of Law; B.A., 1988, Wichita State University.
**Associate, Law Offices of Robert T. Stiles, P.C., Fort Worth, Tex. J.D., 1994, University
of Oklahoma College of Law; B.A., 1991, Southern Methodist University.
***Macon Morehouse, 200 Indian Protestors Expected, ATLANTA J. CONST., Oct. 21, 1995,
at DII.
1. Arlene B. Hirschfelder, The Treatment of Iroquois Indians in Selected American History
Textbooks, INDIAN HISTORIAN, Fall 1975, at 32-39 (vol. 8, no. 2); see also NATIVE AMERICANS,
STEREOTYPES, DISTORTIONS AND OMISSIONS IN U.S. HISTORY TEXTBOOKS (Council on Interracial
Books for Children ed., 1977) [hereinafter NATIVE AMERICANS].
2. THE PRETEND INDIANS: IMAGES OF NATIVE AMERICANS IN THE MOVIES (Gretchen M.
Bataille & Charles L. P. Silet eds., 1980); RALPH BRAUER & DONNA BRAUER, THE HORSE, THE
GUN, AND THE PIECE OF PROPERTY: CHANGING IMAGES Of THE TV WESTERN 171-94 (1975)
(chapter titled "Indians, Blacks, Old People, Long Hairs, and Other Assorted Deviants").
3. John Lowell Bean, The Language of Stereotype, Distortion, and Inaccuracy, INDIAN
HISTORIAN, Fall 1969, at 56 (vol. 2, no. 3).
4. CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CTR. OF NEW YORK FUND, GUIDELINES ON CHOOSING TOYS FOR
CHILDREN 1-3 (1977).
5. Jim Killackey, Team Names Mock Indians, Speaker Says, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 27,
1993, at 9.
6. Id.
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minorities, as well as whites, "not to buy into the image" which portrays
Indians as "less than intelligent," and "to stop, learn and understand" the
harmful effects of stereotyping.7 "We're not just afterthoughts," Tripp
emphasized, "We didn't die off in the 19th Century. We're living people."'
However, despite the efforts of civil rights groups, Indian leaders, and
other concerned citizens, many people continue to tolerate discrimination
against Native Americans." Traditional legal remedies such as equal
protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment have failed to eliminate
derogatory stereotypes. Courts reason that "no right or privilege accorded
to others is denied the Indians."" Protests, education and legislation have
achieved mixed results in the battle to end the use of Indian caricatures,
nicknames and mascots, but this cannot end the struggle. The consequences
of these discriminatory images are far-reaching. In fact, the derogatory
portrayal of Indians which is perpetuated by sports mascots, advertisements,
movies, literature, and children's toys has been linked to many serious
problems in Indian society."
This comment examines the progress made towards eliminating
derogatory Indian stereotypes from American society. To provide a
framework for examining current reform efforts, this article begins in part
I by providing a brief historical look at the evolution of the modern Indian
stereotypes." Examples of derogatory Native American images from the
early days of European Exploration, Indian Reorganization, Termination and
Relocation, and Self-Determination and Self-Governance" are listed,
corresponding to the different eras in U.S. Indian Policy. Part I then exam-
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. The American Indian Movement (AIM) highlights the much higher tolerance level
towards racially biased images portraying Native Americans, as compared to other ethnic
minorities. Julie Cart, What's in a Nickname? The Ability to Stir Players and Fans Is Taking
Back Seat to Heightened Sensibilities, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1991, at IC. Billy Tiac, from AIM's
Washington, DC office, believes that most people in the United States simply do not understand
that derogatory stereotypes such as "redskins" are just as offensive to Native Americans, as other
more well known ethnic slurs.
10. EI-Em Band of Pomo Indians of Sulpher Bank Rancheria v. 49th Dist. Agric. Fair Ass'n,
359 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
!1. Gregory Huskisson, Logo Flap Symbolizes Deeper Indian Worries, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
Nov. 3, 1998, at tB.
12. This listing is not a complete chronology. For a more detailed description, see RAYMOND
W. STEDMAN, SHADOWS OF THE INDIAN: STEREOTYPES IN AMERICAN CULTURE 15 (1982).
13. See FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 47 (Rennard Strickland et




ines the modern Indian stereotype and the effect it has on Indians and non-
Indians with a focus on what non-Indians are taught. The link between
negative stereotypes and other Indian problems such as alcoholism, teen
suicide and other health concerns is also examined.
Part II surveys the growing movement to remove Indian stereotypes from
society, focusing on the current issues - sports mascots, team and product
names. Additionally, part II examines the means used today to increase
awareness, including protests, legislation, advertising campaigns, and legal
action.
Finally, part Eli examines the legal (constitutional and legislative) aspects
to Indian stereotypes, highlighting the similarities between the unresolved
issues created by derogatory stereotypes and existing case law. The analysis
further illustrates why constitutional arguments have been unable to provide
relief. Part I also examines other, more promising avenues to eliminating
derogatory stereotypes in specific instances under the Public Accom-
modations Act and Trademark law and new legislative initiatives.
The bulk of the analysis of this comment focuses on the progress made
by current Indian leaders, civil rights organizations, legislators and private
citizens, with an emphasis on what remains to be accomplished in the
future. Specifically: What possible legal remedies are available? What
responsibility does the media have to correct or refuse to portray negative
Indian stereotypes? How can the public be made conscious of the inherent
racism in these images?
The fight to eliminate American Indian stereotypes is far from over.
Activists and leaders such as Michael Haney, 4 Sen. Ben Nighthorse
Campbell, 5 and Vernon Bellecourt"6 have made an impact and gained
recognition for the movement in many different ways. Others have made
less noticeable, but equally important contributions. Additionally, there has
also been a surge of complaints filed with various state and federal
agencies, arguing that the use of Indian symbols is offensive and demeaning
to Native Americans.
7
14. See Wes Smith, Fighting For His People: Michael Haney Stands Up to Those Who
Would Trivialize the Heritage of American Indians, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 1993, at C 1I.
15. Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R.-Colo.) is responsible for introducing legislation to
block stadium construction until the Redskins change their team name. See S. Res. 1207, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
16. Vernon Bellecourt founded the American Indian Movement (AIM), and is active in the
coalition of minority groups opposing Indian mascots. Minority Coalition Wants Braves to Be
Renamed, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 18, 1991, at D4.
17. Complaints have been filed generally with Human Relations and Trademark authorities.
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L Images of the Indian in American History
A. Sources of Stereotypes
The stereotypical portrayal of Native Americans is not a modern
phenomena. From the time the first Europeans encountered Indians in North
America, the culture, religion and traditions of Native Americans have been
misunderstood. With no understanding of such a foreign people and by
regarding Indians as savages and animals, not a race of people, it became
easy for the early white settlers to feel justified and guiltless about pushing
Indians off their lands. 8 Subsequent generations of children have been
permitted to reduce Indians to playground characters, perpetuated by
literature and popular entertainment such as movies, cartoons, and television
which portrayed the Indian as a villainous savage who attacked the white
hero or the wagon train. 9 The result has been a culmination of
delegitimization and desensitization of their culture which only in the last
twenty years has been addressed."
B. Historical Images Through the Eras of Indian Policy2
One cannot understand the realities of the modern Indian without under-
standing the popular images.22 The collection of materials describing the
depiction of Native Americans is enormous, with entire volumes focusing
on stereotypes in specific mediums, themes or time periods. Author
Raymond William Stedman has done extensive research into images of the
Native American.' Using Stedman's extensive research, the chronology in
Table 1 is offered, not to provide a complete account of the portrayal of
Native Americans throughout history, but merely to provide a backdrop for
current reforms.
18. STEDMAN, supra note 12, at 10; see RoY H. PEARCE, SAVAGISM & CIVILIZATION: A
STUDY OF THE INDIAN AND THE AMERICAN MIND 68 (Johns Hopkins Paperbacks ed. 2d prtg.
1971). See generally Robert A. Williams, Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy
of European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31
ARIZ. L. REv. 237 (1989).
19. STEDMAN, supra note 12, at 10.
20. See generally STEDMAN, supra note 12.
21. See COHEN, supra note 13. This revision of Cohen's 1942 work lists the eras of Indian
policy. See also STEDMAN, supra note 12 (examples of historic Indian stereotypes).
22. Rennard Strickland, Foreword, in STEDMAN, supra note 12, at ix.
23. Raymond W. Stedman traces prevailing images of the American Indian from 1493, when
Columbus wrote about "Los Indios," through modem films such as "A Man Called Horse." See
STEDMAN, supra note 12. Stedman uses literature and film to illustrate how stereotypes, both
modem and historical, make this "illusory Indian" seem more authentic to many Americans than
the citizens of the many diverse tribes who make up the Native American population. Id. at xv.
[Vol. 20
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24. COHEN, supra note 13, at 50.
25. STEDMAN, supra note 12, at 254.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 255.
28. COHEN, supra note 13, at 62.
29. STEDMAN, supra note 12, at 256.
30. Id. at 257.
31. Id. at 258.
32. COHEN, supra note 13, at 127.
33. See DELOS S. OTIS, THE DAwEs ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS, quoted
in COHEN', supra note 13, at 128-29.
34. COHEN, supra note 13, at 259.
TABLE 1 - CHRONOLOGY OF IMAGES
Era: Events: Predominant Indian Stereoptypes
(1532-1789) Legal precedents established by - In Des Cannibales, Michel de
Exploration, European colonists provided the Montaigne portrays the Indians of
Settlement & framework for U.S. legal policy' "Brazil" as Noble Savages.'
the Struggle • Pocahontas (as Lady Rebecca)
for Empire delights the English court. '
- Daniel Defoe's Robinson Crusoe
introduces the faithful Indian ser-
vant and companion, complete with
garbled English."
(1789-1871) The Constitution was adopted and • James N. Barker's The Indian
The Formative Congress used statutes and treaties Princess, or La Belle Savage, is
Years to deal with Indians.m staged in Philadelphia. This drama
about Pocahontas is the first "Indian
play" to reach the footlights."
• James Fenimore Cooper introduc-
es The Last of the Mohicans, in
which Indians are characterized as
"good" (Algonquin-Delaware) or
"bad" (Iroquois-Huron)
- Buffalo Bill is introduced to the
world of fiction in a dime novel by
Ned Buntline."
(1871-1928) Treaty making is terminated for * Sitting Bull is killed and the Mas-
Allotment and political reasons and Congress sacre at Wounded Knee is carried
Assimilation abolishes the creation of reserva- out by the Seventh Cavalry, while
tions by executive order 2 "The the Buffalo Bill combinations
zealous humanitarian reformers of evolve into outdoor Wild West
the period desired that the Indian shows."
be absorbed into the mainstream of
American life and the 'savagery'
represented by tribal autonomy be
destroyed.""
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TABLE 1 -CHRONOLOGY OF VALUES (cont.)
Era Events Predominant Indian Stereotypes
(1928-1942) The Meriam Report was intro- • Chingachgook is partly reanimated
Indian duced, with "[t]he central recom- through the Lone Ranger's Tonto,"
Reorganization mendation (to make] Indian Policy • The howling Indian returns to
broad enough for Indians to be prominence in motion pictures such
absorbed into the prevailing civili- as Drums Along the Mohawk and
zation at least in accordance with a Kit Carson.
minimum standard of health and
decency." 
(1943-1961) This period was characterized by ° Broken Arrow signals a several-
Termination "the most concerted drive against year trend toward noble Hollywood
and Indian property and survival since Indians."
Relocation the removals following the acts of




(1961-present) Increased concern for civil rights * Moviemakers concoct a
Self- is reflected in Indian Affairs.3 pseudofactual melange of anthropo-
Determination logical errors and white supremacy
in A Man Called Horse.'
C. The Modern Indian Stereotype
The stereotypical Indian is alive and well. While an abundance of
examples can be seen in commercial products, literature, television, movies
and children's toys, popular sports mascots, nicknames, and even official
team names provide especially vivid examples. High school teams as well
as professional sports organizations use Indian tribal names and mascot
"likenesses" of Native Americans to symbolize their ferocious athletic
teams.4 These nicknames and mascots illustrate the heightened tolerance
which exists for racist stereotypes aimed at Native Americans. Beverly
Clark, vice-chairman of the Michigan Civil Rights Commission, explains
that "these nicknames and logos suggest that Native Americans are warlike,
savage people who attack without mercy and fight to the death. 42
35. OTIS, supra note 33, at 6.
36. STEDMAN, supra note 12, at 260.
37. ANGIE DEao, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 349 (1970), quoted
in COHEN, supra note 13, at 153.
38. STEDMAN, supra note 12, at 260.
39. COHEN, supra note 13, at 180.
40. STEDMAN, supra note 12, at 260.
41. Larry Lipman, Indians Upset by Sports Stereotypes: Native Americans Resent Fan's
Tomahawks, War Paint, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 15, 1991 at B4.




With respect to the image of Native Americans in sports today, there
seems to be a final delegitimization into a market item.43 Seen as part of
the issue of team names and included in the complaints are the mascots and
symbols (assorted "chiefs" and "Indians"), paraphernalia (tomahawks, war
bonnets, war paint, and scalps worn by fans), and actions by the fans and
club (war whoops and "Indian chants" set to organ music, flashing words
such as "scalp them," the marketing of Indian-style souvenirs, and the
sanctioning of men coming out of teepees and doing dances). The
motivation for marketers of products with stereotypical Indian images is
simple. A demand exists, and sales of these items can be incredibly
lucrative." This profit motive has driven entrepreneurs to produce an
assortment of items displaying Indian stereotypes. T-shirts, pennants, and
even toilet paper and boxer shorts with tribal symbols are proudly displayed
by Redskins, Chiefs and Braves fans.45
Many Native Americans are disheartened that, although sensitivity to
other ethnic groups seems to be increasing, offensive epithets characterizing
Indians are not only tolerated, but widespread. Although the mascots and
nicknames seem extremely prejudicial when closely examined, the fact
remains that many Americans simply do not realize these stereotypes are
even derogatory. A total of 86% of Michigan residents surveyed by the
Detroit Free Press did not find names such as "Redskins," "Braves," or
43. Indian peoples are reduced to team names. A good example are the Florida State
University Seminoles.
44. The simple rubber tomahawk used for the "tomahawk chop," is an excellent example of
the financial rewards made possible by marketing promotional items featuring Indian stereotypes.
Walencia Konrad, 200,000 Foam Tomahawks: That's Not Chopped Liver, Bus. WK., Nov. 1I,
1991, at 48. This arm motion, which mimics chopping behavior in the air to show team support,
originated in the 1980s among football fans of the Florida State Seminoles. Id. When the chop
was revived by Atlanta Braves baseball fans in 1992, Paul Braddy took advantage of the
opportunity. Id. A foam-bedding salesman from Tennessee, Braddy designed a small rubber
tomahawk and began sales through the concessionaire at the Atlanta Fulton County Stadium in
1991. Id. By November 1991, he had 23 employees, a distribution network that spanned 20
states, and had sold 200,000 of the foam tomahawks at an average wholesale price of $3.00 each.
Id. His clients now include K-Mart Corporation and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Id.
Not surprisingly, many Indian groups are less than pleased by the sight of thousands of
baseball fans chopping the air with little rubber tomahawks and whooping "war chants." Cart,
supra note 9, at IC. Braves President Stan Kasten has agreed to discuss the mascot issue and the
use of the tomahawks with Native American groups. Konrad, supra, at 48. But in case Kasten
acquiesces to the Indian leaders, the originator of the rubber tomahawks has an alternative
marketing plan ready. Id. He is negotiating with the National Basketball Association, and is
already shipping tomahawks to colleges and universities with Indian mascots. Id. Clearly the
availability of such a large market and the enormous potential profits are powerful motivators.
Demand for products with derogatory Indian images must be considered when searching for a
solution.
45. The likeness of the Indian hero, Crazy Horse, has even been used to advertise malt
liquor. Konnie LeMay, Oglalas Find Crazy Horse Brand Hard to Swallow, LAKOTA TIMES, Apr.
15, 1992, at Al.
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"Chiefs" offensive." Some participants actually considered these images
to be a compliment to Native Americans.47 Even some Native Americans
themselves are not offended by these nicknames and mascots and find the
issue unimportant."
D. Effect of Indian Stereotypes
1. Effect in General
Many negative stereotypes are internalized long before the first exposure
to the sports team stereotypes "Chiefs" or "Redskins." Exposure to
derogatory, inaccurate Indian stereotypes begins, for many Americans, in
early childhood and continues through adolescence and into adulthood. "The
image of Indians as savage and warlike, created by white settlers to justify
exploitation, creeps into all elements of society," said Arthur Stine of the
Michigan Department of Civil Rights. "Such depictions can erode self-
image among Indians, hamper their achievements and trivialize sacred and
religious customs."5
Low self-esteem can lead to serious consequences. "These [stereotypical
Indian] symbols are a vehicle for giving tremendous power," said Arthur
Taylor, a sports psychologist at Northeastern University." As a result of
this power, many Native Americans believe derogatory Indian stereotypes
are directly linked to health risks such as increased rates of suicide,
homicide and alcohol abuse." The National Congress of American Indians
emphasizes the serious consequences of these negative images: "The
continued insensitive projection of false stereotypes has resulted in untold
harm to, and discrimination against, the American Indian. Such portrayals
have resulted in real socioeconomic handicaps and loss of self-esteem
46. Should Indian Symbols Used as Team Logos be Modified or Eliminated?, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Oct. 11, 1988, at IIA.
47. Id.
48. Navajo spokesperson Duane Beyal believes that the mascot images are not offensive.
Tim Giago, Vengeance Is Mine Sayeth the Great Spirit, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Oct. 20, 1993,
at A4. He said, "So what if the word is the white man's? It has a connotation I can live with,
We embraced [the word] because when you say 'Redskin,' everyone knows you mean a fierce
warrior." Id. Harry Command, director of American Indian Services in Michigan, also believes
the logo issue is of secondary importance. Huskisson, supra note 11, at IB. "If this were an issue
in the Indian community, I think I would have been the first to know it. I think it's an issue with
the media," Church said. Id. "Our priorities are developing a Native American economy,
providing adequate health and human services, autonomy and education." Id.
49. Rogers Worthington, Indian Groups Split on What's in a Name, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 16,
1989, at 26C.
50. Id.
51. Cart, supra note 9, at IC.
52. Antonia C. Novello, Crazy Horse Malt Liquor Beverage: The Public Outcry to Save the




among members of the Indian population."53 JoAnn Morris, a Native
American educator, describes the impact of stereotyping on Native
Americans:
Up until the present day, the American public has been fed,
and has accepted as fact, inaccurate information about Native
Americans .... The damage that can be done by attributing
stereotyped characteristics to another, or to oneself, is immea-
surable. When looked at through image-colored glasses, an
individual is never seen as an individual; he is not seen for what
he is but for what he "ought" to be.'
As Morris's description points out, these stereotypes can lead to negative
self-esteem and cause serious problems throughout the Indian population.
Documentation of the long-term consequences of these stereotypes among
Native Americans is desperately needed.
2. The Stereotypical Indian and Children
Libby gave Barney a teasing glance. "Red earth, white
clouds and blue water - Daddy, are you patriotic!"
"Well, now Punkin, I guess you're right. This really is a
piece of our American life, right among the Indians. You wait
and see, some day they'll be real fine American citizens."
"Oh, Daddy, not those savages."
"They've got a lot of things to learn, too, honey. Give them
time. They've got lots of good in them. "5
The passage above, with its patronizing attitude and message that Indians
may be "good" despite the fact that they are "savages," is not uncharacteris-
tic of many children's books that remain in school libraries today. This
distorted stereotypical "Indian" is readily apparent in children's literature,
toys and even in school textbooks." When viewed as a whole, the
overwhelming derogatory impact of these characterizations on children
cannot be ignored. Yet this is precisely what is happening. The conse-
quences of indoctrinating children with these racially biased stereotypes are
not recognized by a majority of Americans. This section discusses the
impact of stereotypical Indian images portrayed to children. The major
53. Letters to the Editor, NCAI SENTINEL, Aug. 1969, at 3.
54. JoAnn Morris, Stereotypes: Neither Side is Open or Free, TALKING LEAF, Aug. 1975,
at 13.
55. TRADING POST GIRL (n.d.), reprinted in Mary Gloyne Byler, Introduction to American
Indian Authors for Young Readers, in AMERICAN INDIAN STEREOTYPES IN THE WORLD OF
CHILDREN: A READER AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 35, 38 (Arlene B. Hirschfelder ed., 1982) [hereinafter
AMERICAN INDIAN STEREOTYPES].
56. See generally AMERICAN INDIAN STEREOTYPES, supra note 55.
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influence which children's books and commercial toys can have in the
development of future attitudes and prejudices is emphasized. Specific
products illustrate the most common stereotypical images and serve as
concrete examples. The impact of children's exposure to these materials
cannot continue to be overlooked and underestimated.
Sociological studies have shown that racial awareness begins at a very
young age. In his 1954 work, The Nature of Prejudice," Gordon Allport
emphasized the importance of the childhood years in the development of
racial attitudes. "The first six years of life are important for the develop-
ment of all social attitudes," he said, "though it is a mistake to regard early
childhood as alone responsible. A bigoted personality may be well under
way by the age of six, but by no means fully fashioned."5
After examining the distorted images of Indians that children are exposed
to from a very young age, it is not difficult to understand why many sports
fans don't find mascots like "Chief Wahoo" or team names such as
"Redskins" offensive. How can we expect adults to redevelop healthy
attitudes about racial differences when taught differently as children? Mary
Ellen Goodman, a cultural anthropologist, has done significant research
concerning children's awareness of race differences and the development of
racial prejudice. 9 Her research supports the conclusion that children
develop racial awareness at a very early age.' Goodman suggests that
racial prejudices can be well formed by the age of five years, and that adult
attitudes about race are usually established by the age of seven."'
Despite what many children are still taught, "I" does not stand for Indian.
As many experts in children's literature and in culture's of indigenous
peoples realize, "I" often stands for Ignorance.' Native Americans are
continually portrayed, not as citizens of the many diverse tribes that exist
in the modern United States, but as one-dimensional caricatures of wild
savages or as stoic historical relics. Instead of "men" and "women," Indians
in many children's books are referred to as "braves," who invariably seem
to be "whooping" while standing on one leg, or as "squaws" carrying a
"papoose" on their backs.63 The Indians seen in many children's books bear
no real relationship to an identified tribe or even to a specific time
period.' Most likely, the story revolves around a depersonalized Indian
character who wears fringed buckskins, beaded moccasins and' a feathered
57. See GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954).
58. Id. at 297.
59. See MARY ELLEN GOODMAN, RACE AWARENESS IN YOUNG CHILDREN (rev'd. ed. 1964).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 254.
62. Michael A. Dorris, Foreword, in AMERICAN INDIAN STEREOTYPES, supra note 55, at vii.
63. Id.




headband, as he attacks peaceful Settlers with a bow and arrow."' Many
Indian characters are not even named but just referred to as "the Indians,"
while white characters in the same book have personal names, vivid
personalities and are described in detail.'
Another common characteristic of these books is the ridicule of Indian
life and customs. 7 Themes commonly ridicule traditions such as the name-
giving practices of certain tribes and the practice of giving an eagle feather
as a symbol of honor and courage." The religious and cultural practices
of Native Americans are turned into whimsical children's tales which distort
their true significance and meaning. This lack of respect for Native
American culture exists even in textbooks, further perpetuating myths about
Indians, and in many children's eyes, adding an air of authority to these
inaccurate portrayals.' Although some progress has been made," there
is much more work to be done.
For example, many textbooks refer to Indians as the "first immigrants,"
based on the theory that they migrated from Asia to Alaska over a "land
bridge.""' This theory is essentially unproven, and serves to justify the
European conquest of the New World. The implication conveyed is that the
Indians possess no greater claim to the land than later immigrants from
Europe, the Indians were merely "there first."' "Native Americans should
be portrayed as the original inhabitants of the continent," states the Council
on Interracial Books for Children.73 Scientific facts are simply not
compatible with the notion that Indians were simply the first in a long line
of immigrants. "In fact, evidence of 'modem man' existing in the
Americas over 70,000 years ago predates knowledge of such life in
Europe.""5
Another common fault is the gross oversimplification of every facet of
Indian life. Diverse tribes are lumped together into regional groups, and
then, misleading and highly inaccurate generalizations are made about entire
groups.76 The simple fact that Native North American societies contained
65. Id. at 6.
66. Id. at 5.
67. Id. at 6.
68. Id.
69. See generally NATIVE AMERICANS, supra note 1.
70. See generally Bibliography: Section 2: Corrective Material, in AMERICAN INDIAN
STEREOTYPES, supra note 55, at 269.
71. AMERICAN INDIAN STEREOTYPES, supra note 55, at 81 (quoting D'ARCY McNICKLE,





76. School textbooks have been guilty of this type of scholarship. For example, one textbook
stated:
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more than 300 distinct languages and more then 500 separate cultures,77
emphasizes the magnitude of oversimplification which exists. The
oversimplifications, inaccuracies and blatantly racist portrayals of Native
Americans in textbooks highlight the completely Eurocentric perspective
conveyed to many children, under the guise of a history lesson.
These "history" lessons often include terms such as "advanced culture"'
to describe European society. Indians are described as "primitive," and
characterized as "friendly" or "unfriendly."79 The emphasis in many
textbooks is on the Indian of the past, implying that modem Indian society
is nonexistent or unimportant. These cultures have not disappeared, but are
alive and well in hundreds of dynamic, contemporary societies.
Perhaps the most pervasive theme in these textbooks is the equation of
Native Americans with warlike behavior and violence." In fact, many of
the behaviors which were perceived as violent and aggressive by the white
settlers, whose views are reflected in the history texts, were actually caused
by the European conquest.8' For example, when Indians fought back as
their homes and lands were taken from them by force, this was character-
ized as warlike behavior. As white settlers invaded the territory of certain
tribes, these tribes were forced onto the traditional lands of other Indians,
causing much of the intertribal conflict and aggression. 2
Derogatory Indian stereotypes are not relegated to the world of literature.
Unfortunately, many children have a distorted image of Native Americans
The Eastern Woodland Tribes lived in the region east of the Mississippi River,
from Canada to Florida.... The Indians hunted for their food and clothing....
The Eastern Woodland Indians were farmers, too, and they grew com, beans and
squash. They lived in buildings called longhouses, which were rows of apartments,
shared by several families. The men hunted and fished; the women tended the
fields and gathered the fruit. They had money called wampum, which consisted
of bits of seashells strung together like beads.
AMERICAN INDIAN STEREOTYPES, supra note 55, at 85.
77. Id.
78. School textbooks have also stated:
A conflict of cultures. The Eastern Woodland Indians did not develop a highly
advanced culture. But their culture did make it possible for them to live in ways
suited to their needs.... Beginning in the mid-1600's, the world of the Eastern
Woodland Indians suddenly changed. The Indians faced Europeans, who were
people with more advanced cultures.
Id. at 85 (emphasis added).
79. Another textbook contained the following passage: "A friendly Indian named Squanto
helped the colonists. He showed them how to plant corn and how to live on the edge of the
wilderness. A soldier, Captain Miles Standish, taught the Pilgrims how to defend themselves
against unfriendly Indians." Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
80. "War was a part of the way of life of these southeastern Indians." Id.
81. DAVID R. WRONE & RUSSELL S. NELSON, WHO'S THE SAVAGE? A DOCUMENTARY





even before they reach history class. Some of the most inaccurate,
oversimplified and demeaning images of Indians are meant for very young
children. Children's toys such as "play Indian villages," blocks with Indian
caricatures, and toy bows and arrows provide concrete examples of this
stereotypical imagery." These toys introduce young children to an
ethnocentric and unrealistic portrayal of Native American history, culture
and modern life, setting the stage for history book embellishment once the
children enter school.
This racist portrayal of American Indians has a major effect on both
Native American children as well as children from other ethnic back-
grounds. For the child who is never given the opportunity to learn about the
many diverse Indian cultures, lifestyles and religions, the "Indian" can take
on a frightening connotation with no relevance to the real world. For
example, when the parents of a five-year-old boy in St. Louis tried to
explain to him the Indian heritage of his newly adopted sister, he asked
them, "Will [she] kill us when she grows up?"' John Fadden, who works
at the Six Nations Indian Museum in upstate New York, reports that it is
not uncommon for "children [to] refuse to come onto the grounds of the
museum because of an intense fear of possibly meeting an Indian. Some
actually cry and scream."85  These children are being denied access to
a vast amount of knowledge applicable to modem life. For example, many
children will never know that most Indians were not roaming hunters, but
lived in villages with agricultural societies,86 or that decision-making power
in many tribes rested equally with men and womenY Lessons learned by
studying traditional Indian societies could provide insight into understanding
modern life. To deny children the opportunity to learn from the advanced
and diverse peoples, who lived on this continent for tens of thousands of
years, is to provide them with an incomplete account of American history.
For Native American children, the effects of these stereotypical images
are often even more tragic. Many of these children can, and do internalize
these stereotypes and hostile attitudes towards Indians.8 This greatly
interferes with the child's development of a positive self image and racial
identity, and can discourage the child from developing his or her potential
83. Arlene B. Hirschfelder, Toys with Indian Imagery, in AMERICAN INDIAN STEREOTYPES,
supra note 55, at 144.
84. Robert B. Moore & Arlene B. Hirschfelder, Feathers, Tomahawks and Tipis: A Study
of Stereotyped "Indian" Imagery in Children's Picture Books, in UNLEARNING INDIAN
STEREOTYPES (Council on Interracial Books for Children eds., 1977).
85. Id. at 47.
86. AMERICAN INDIAN STEREOTYPES, supra note 55, at viii.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 145.
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skills and talents, thus turning the negative stereotype into a self-fulfilling
prophecy.89
Sandy Nowack, counselor for a group of Native American boys in
Norman, Oklahoma, sees a wide variation in self-esteem levels."0 In a
recent after-school discussion, she asked the boys to tell the group their
name, their tribe, and why they liked being a Native American. "It was easy
to tell which boys had bought into the Indian stereotypes," Nowack said.9
Her favorite answer was, "I like being a Native American because we're
sacred."" But all responses were not that positive. One child said, "I like
being art Indian because we get to shoot bows and arrows."93 Nowack
believes that, to some Native American children, the images of the
stereotypical Indians seem so real that these children actually believe they're
supposed to wear "war paint" and "scalp" people. 4
There have been recent changes. The second-graders at Purcell
Elementary School didn't learn about Pilgrims or the "friendly Indian,
Squanto," this Thanksgiving. Instead, they met Native American guests
from three different tribes, learned about the people who were living in
North America when the Europeans arrived, and even got to sample
traditional tribal cooking. "I think it's really important for the different
cultures in this classroom to be represented," said their teacher, Kelley
Chandler. "We're very fortunate to have three different tribes represented,
and I'm grateful to the family members who took the time to come and
speak with my class."9 Efforts such as these can make a difference in how
children perceive themselves and others of different races. Other approach-
es, such as public protests, use of the media, and utilization of the legal
system can also be effective.
II. Change Through Social Pressure: A Survey of Current Battles
A. Mascots and Nicknames
The issue of sports team names and mascots is perhaps the most visible
sign of the ongoing struggle against Native American stereotypes. In the
1970s, a campaign by various Native American leaders resulted in many
colleges scrapping their Indian nicknames.97 Many colleges then followed
89. Id.
90. Interview with Sandy Nowack, Editor-in-Chief, American Indian Law Review, in





95. Interview with Kelley Chandler, Schoolteacher, Purcell School District, in Purcell, Okla.
(Oct. 11, 1993).
96. Id




the lead of Stanford University, which changed its nickname from the
Indians to the Cardinals. Recently, there has been a renewed push for the
removal of Indian names from professional athletic teams, thanks in part to
the prominence of such teams as baseball's Atlanta Braves and the National
Football League's Washington Redskins." Unfortunately, these steps
toward equality must be assessed against a backdrop of determined
resistance posed by holdout organizations. The following examples highlight
the continuing efforts.
1. Atlanta Braves
Demonstrations held in Minneapolis, Minnesota during the 1991 World
Series, to protest the Atlanta Braves baseball team's use of Indian symbols
as mascots focused national attention on efforts to end derogatory stereo-
types of Native Americans." In filing his Human Rights Commission
complaint against the Atlanta Braves, Ojibwe tribal member Fred Veilleux
said the team name demeaned Indians."m The complaint charged that use
of the Braves name as a mascot, along with its tomahawk logo, incites,
invites, promotes and provokes the public and the fans into acts that insult
Indians and deny them the enjoyment of a public place.' His complaint
is founded on federal antidiscrimination laws. Specifically, the claim relies
on the public accommodations section of the civil rights laws, which
provides that a person cannot be denied equal enjoyment of a public facility
5, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Sports File. Stanford University and the University
of Oklahoma are two of many schools that have abandoned their Indian mascots.
98. It is certainly no secret that Native Americans received a lot of media exposure due to
the high degree of publicity surrounding the Atlanta Braves and the Cleveland Indians reaching
the 1995 World Series, as well as the successful seasons enjoyed by the Washington Redskins.
See Mike Downey, These Names Are Deserving of Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1995, at Cl;
Andrew Glass, World Series Victims or Mascots?, ATLANTA J. CONsT., Oct. 23, 1995, at A 1;
Macon Morehouse, 200 Indian Protestors Expected, ATLANTA J. CONST., Oct. 21, 1995, at DI 1;
Gary Pomerantz, Protest Targets Indian Mascots: Native Americans Return for Series, ATLANTA
J. CONST., Oct. 20, 1995, at El; Barbara Reynolds, History Demands End to "Redskins," USA
TODAY, Feb. 5. 1993, at All.
99. See Steve Jacobson, WORLD SERIES/Braves vs. Twins; Respect Indians In Home of
the Braves, NEWSDAY, Oct. 20, 1991, at Sports 4. The Atlanta Braves played the Minnesota
Twins in the 1991 World Series. There had been complaints for years against mascots Native
American's considered offensive, but there had been little, if any media attention. In Minneapolis,
where the World Series was played, about 50,000 Indians form the third-largest urban
concentration of Indians in the United States. Minneapolis is also the headquarters of American
Indian Movement (AIM). Id. Various groups were able to organize in larger numbers and take
advantage of the World Series media. Id.
100. See Minority Coalition Wants to be Renamed, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 19, 1991, at D4.
101. Id.
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because of their race, color, creed, or national origin."~ Similar protests
surrounded the 1995 World Series."m
In an attempt by sports officials to broach the subject, quiet negotiation
began soon after between Native Americans and the president of baseball's
Braves over the team's nickname and the fans' "tomahawk chop" chant.
Assurance was received from Braves owner Ted Turner that the concerns
would be addressed, although tribal leaders vowed that nothing short of
change is the ultimate goal."
2. Iowa
Sioux City, Iowa is a "model of civic progressiveness, according to the
Washington Post."" In February 1993, the Sioux City baseball team
(formerly the Sioux City Soos) became the first professional sports
organization to change its name in an effort to respect the feelings of Native
peoples." The original Sioux City mascot was "Lonesome Polecat," who
was depicted as "a cartoon Indian clad in a loincloth, flailing a hatchet and
grinning drunkenly."" 7 Frank La Mere, a Winnebago who heads the
Nebraska Indian Inter-Tribal Development Council, was instrumental in
bringing about the change." His response to the arguments of those who
support the use of Indian mascots, and to specific articles published in local
editorials," is gimple and to the point:
People say that Indians have bigger problems than mascots
and use of Native American images, but I disagree. If you can't
102. Under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, public accommodations include: any
inn, hotel, motel or other establishment that provides lodging to transient guests (except for small
boarding houses); facilities that sell food for consumption on the premises, such as restaurants,
cafeterias, lunchrooms, lunch counters and soda fountains; gasoline service stations; and places
of exhibition or entertainment, such as motion picture houses, theaters, concert halls, sports arenas
and stadiums. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1988). "Why can't an Indian family go to a ballgame
without having to put up with the mockery?" Veilleaux said. Jacobson, supra note 99.
103. See Macon Morehouse, 200 Indian Protestors Expected, ATLANTA J. CONST., Oct. 21,
1995, at D1l; Gary Pomerantz, Protest Targets Indian Mascots: Native Americans Return for
Series, ATLANTA J. CONST., Oct. 29, 1995, at El.
104. Rachel Shuster, Meetings Open Today in Atlanta on Team Name, USA TODAY, Nov.
20, 1991, at 3C.
105. Coleman McCarthy, No New Name, No New Stadium, WASI. POST, Feb. 20, 1993, at
A21.
106. The team is now named the "Sioux City Explorers," in honor of nineteenth-century
explorers Lewis and Clark. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. One article criticizing the name change complained about "the hokey concept of
political correctness. I think it is a bunch of garbage ... If the (Indians) are really concerned





see me as an individual, then how can you understand the
problems we have as a people? We have taken much heat, and
the backlash has been tremendous, but we can take it. If our
children do not have to endure the insults we have endured, then
our efforts will have been worth it."'
3. Massachusetts
In February 1991, the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination
supported legislation to change the Massachusetts state seal."' The seal
depicts an Indian holding a bow and arrow, with an arm holding a sword above
the Indian's head. "The emblem depicts [Indians] as war-making. .. " said the
executive director of the State Commission on Indian Affairs. "The Indian is
all right, but we'd like to remove that sword from above his head," director
John Peters, Sr. added. Peters believes that the involvement of the an-
tidiscrimination commission may elicit a more favorable reaction from
legislators on stereotype issues."' The commission also appointed a commit-
tee to investigate the use of Indian likenesses for school mascots."'
4. Minnesota
In April 1989, the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union (CLU) publicly
denounced the use of Indian stereotypes, and threatened to take further legal
action."' Supported by the Board of Education, the organization threat-
ened to sue public schools which refuse to eliminate Indian names or logos
for athletic teams." 5 "These symbols are discriminatory and demeaning,"
said Matthew Stark, director of the Minnesota CLU. Stark emphasized his
belief that derogatory Indian stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the 14th Amendment." 6 However, by late 1993 no action had yet been
taken. A review of the ruling is still planned for the mid 1990s.
5. Michigan
Advertising can actually help eliminate discriminatory stereotypes,
instead of merely perpetuating them. An Indian parent in Minneapolis, Phil
St. John, took action when his sons were embarrassed by a whooping fan
110. Id.
Ill. Efrain Hernandez Jr., Antibias Panel Backs Legislation to Alter State Seal Indian Image,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 13, 1991, at 23.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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dressed as an Indian at a high school basketball game.' In March 1987,
he hired an advertising agency to create a poster featuring pennants of
fictitious teams such as the San Diego Caucasians and the Kansas City Jews
next to a Cleveland Indians pennant."' The campaign gained attention for
the fight against stereotypes, and the Michigan Civil Rights Commission has
now denounced Indian nicknames."'
6. Missouri
In November 1992, more than 200 Native Americans protested in Kansas
City, Missouri, during a conference held by the National Coalition on
Racism in Sports and Media." Indian activists included Vernon
Bellecourt and Russell Means, founders of the American Indian Movement
(AIM). 12' The protest took place before a National Football League game
between the Washington Redskins and the Kansas City Chiefs.'
Activist Michael Haney took the fight for Native American rights one
step further by filing a formal complaint with the Missouri Commission on
Human Rights against the National Football League's Kansas City Chiefs
in 1991," alleging that the team's willingness to let its fans dress up as
Indians and act crazily unlawfully deprived him of the right to enjoy Chiefs'
games and that "[t]he negative imagery of mascots and the commercial use
of Indian names create a basis of misunderstanding of our people - a
misunderstanding which breeds prejudice." Haney claimed the team
made him feel "unwelcome because of boisterous and drunken fans [using
racist mascots and chants]."'' " Haney sets a remarkable example and this
suit could be an indication of a new trend in the fight against discrimina-
tion. "Michael has put these issues at the forefront of his life. He speaks
actively and symbolically for 2 million of his people. I've always thought




120. Reuters, Protest of "Chiefs," "Redskins". Indians Call Team Names, "TomahawkChop"
Racist, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 16, 1992, at A2.
121. L
122. it
123. Joseph Keenan, Once Axed, the Tomahawk Chop Back in Swing at Arrowhead, Reuters,
Oct. 12, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Sports File.
124. Native Americans Sue to Stop Kansas City Chiefs From Using Indian Mascot, UPI,
Dec. 5, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Sports File. Targets include the Florida State
University "Seminoles," the University of Illinois "Fightin' Illini," the Washington Redskins, the
Kansas City Chiefs, the Atlanta Braves, the Cleveland Indians, and the National Hockey League
Chicago Blackhawks. There are a wealth of other complaints regarding the use of Indian mascots
at the primary and secondary school level. For the purpose of this article, we will be focusing




American Indian Law and Policy at the University of Oklahoma." "Most
Indians feel demeaned by the use of their names and images as sports
mascots, but few have Haney's dedication to fighting it," Strickland
added.'"
The Kansas City Chiefs have said the team has no intention of changing
its name, but have instead offered some concessions.'" In the Fall of
1992, the Chiefs, who play their home games at Arrowhead Stadium, said
they would not play music that accompanied the arm-wagging tomahawk
chop last year and the team's cheerleaders would not participate in the
activity."9 Sales of sponge tomahawks were also banned at stadium
concession stands.'" But fans persisted in chopping their way through
games anyway and the team relented and gave its sanction to the chop.'
7. Oregon
In February 1992, the Oregonian newspaper discontinued the use of
"sports nicknames [or logos] that may be offensive to racial, religious or
ethnic groups."'3 Included are references to "Braves," "Redskins,"
"Indians," and "Redmen."'33 Editor William A. Hilliard instituted the
change because he believes these images "tend to perpetuate stereotypes that
damage the dignity and self-respect of many people in our society and that
this harm far transcends any innocent entertainment or promotional value
these names may have.""
8. Washington D.C.
Michael Haney'35 led a group of almost 2000 protestors in a game-day
demonstration outside the Metrodome in Minneapolis, as the Washington
126. Wes Smith, Fighting for His People: Michael Haney Stands Up to Those Who Would
Trivialize the Heritage of American Indians, CHi. TRIB., Mar. 28, 1993, at IC.
127. Id.
128. Keenan, supra note 123.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. In a paid advertisement in the Kansas City Star prior to the Chiefs' home game
against the Philadelphia Eagles, the team said it "never meant any disrespect when doing the
chop." Id. "If no offense is intended, why then must offense be taken?" Id.
132. Willaim A. Hilliard, To Our Readers, OREGONIAN, Feb. 16, 1992, at DI.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Michael Haney is Seminole and Lakota and extremely visible in the fight for American
Indian rights. He believes the mascot issue is of utmost importance and is active in fighting to
reclaim the heritage and pride of his people. Haney's activism includes challenging museums to
reclaim artifacts from Indian burial sites, preventing the use of Indian land for hazardous waste
sites, and fighting for continued use of peyote in Native American Church rituals. Smith, supra
note 126, at IC.
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Redskins played in the Super Bowl in 1992."3 On the day before the
protest, Haney and fourteen other activists became involved in a struggle
with security guards." The group of Indian advocates was attempting to
display a banner which read: "Indians are human beings, not mascots for
America's fun and games."'3 Haney had his arm broken and two teeth
knocked out in the brawl.'39 "I don't mind protecting my First Amendment
rights, although I don't always have to get my teeth kicked in," he said
when describing the incident.'"
In September 1993, a small group of about thirty protesters used a
bullhorn to chant slogans and passed out leaflets in front of Robert F.
Kennedy Memorial Stadium to protest the name "Redskins."'4' One of the
demonstrators, Juanita Helphrey, said a man shouted obscenities at her when
she offered him a leaflet explaining why Native Americans find the name
"Redskins" offensive. "The fans hate change," she said. But "one reason the
issue is important is because our children see these images of mascots and
they ask if we're really like that."'42 Another protester, Julia Moon
Sparrow, pointed out that "ninety-nine percent of the people don't care.
Many people have been extremely rude and I think it reflects a great deal
of ignorance.'
43
In early 1992, representatives of various Indian groups filed a petition
with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office demanding that the office cancel
the team's seven registered trademarks that use the nickname Redskins."
In the petition, the petitioners argued "[t]he term 'Redskin' was and is a
pejorative, derogatory, denigrating, offensive, scandalous, contemptuous,












144. Randy Furst, Indian Activists Seek to Have 'Redskins' Stripped of U.S Trademark
Protections, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Sept. 11, 1992, at IA. One argument follows that if the
trademarks were canceled, the team could still use the nickname, but others could too, which
would make it less profitable and thus provide the team with an economic incentive to change
the nickname. Id.
145. Id. In addition to the Washington Redskins, many local teams utilize the same name,
which is more offensive than any other sports nickname to many Native Americans. In Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma, Capitol Hill High School and Southern Nazarene University, with large numbers
of Native American students, both use the nickname "redskins." Jim Killackey, Team Names




Jack Kent Cooke, owner of the team, has said that he would not change
the name, which he says is not disrespectful but instead promotes positive
characteristics such as bravery." In the complaint, the petitioners laid out
a historical case showing that the trademark was derogatory. 47 Among
examples cited was a statement written by a colonialist in 1699: "Ye firste
Meeting House was solid mayde to withstande ye wicked onsaults of ye
Red Skins."'' The petitioners also noted that the 1991 edition of the
American Heritage Dictionary said the term "redskin" was "offensive
slang."'49 At present, this complaint is still progressing through the
Trademark Trial and Review Board.
As Native Peoples protested outside RFK stadium, the Washington
Redskins attempted to "honor" their heritage with some less-than-authentic
pregame entertainment.' While a woman who calls herself "Princess Pale
Moon"'"' sang the Star Spangled Banner, a dozen Native Americans in
"ceremonial dress" translated the anthem into sign language.
The newspaper headline, "Extra Points Cooke Extends Peace Pipe,"
describing the event adds to the negative impact by making the whole
protest seem trivial or humorous.' Making Native Americans the target
of yet another joke, or instituting superficial changes such as the Pale Moon
pageantry, cannot substitute for true reform.
146. Furst, supra note 144, at IA. Redskin fan response was also along these lines with such
comments as: "They've got their rights, but we do not mean any disrespect by the name"; "This
name has been going on for years, so I don't understand why it's an issue now"; "I think it's
ridiculous. Should all horses be offended by the Broncos, or all Twins because of the Minnesota
Twins?"; "The American Indians ought to be proud. We're wearing an Indian on our backs and
this is a winning team." American Indians Demand Name Change, Agence France Presse, Jan.
26, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Sports File.
147. In a recent issue of Indian Country Today, editor Tim Giago responds to Beyal and
other Indians who support the use of Indian mascots by reminding them where the term "redskin"
originated.
The term actually came from the early colonial custom of selling beaverskins,
bearskins, deerskins, and - when there was a bounty on their heads - "redskins"
at the frontier trading post. The colonial government offered so much for an
Indian child, woman or man and the proof was usually the scalp of the victim. To
most Indians, the word "Redskin" means genocide and it can never be dignified
by Vichy compliance.
Tim Giago, Vengeance is Mine Sayeth the Great Spirit, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Oct. 20, 1993,
at A4.
148. Id.
149. Id.; see also WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 987 (1983) ("Redskin"
defined as "American Indian, usually taken to be offensive.").
150. Extra Points Cooke Extends Peace Pipe, NEWSDAY, Nov. 4, 1991, at 111.
151. "Princess Pale Moon" claims Ojibwe and Cherokee lineage but is not enrolled in either
tribe. She was unavailable for comment concerning the spectacle. Id.
152. Id.
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9. Wisconsin
In October 1992, Wisconsin Attorney General James Doyle ruled that
Indian names and logos such as "Warhawks," "Braves," "Chiefs," "Redmen"
and "Redskins" may be discriminatory because they reinforce stereotypes,
and their use should be restricted in public schools.'53 The opinion did not
prohibit the names completely, but left the decision to change with each
school district."M However, if a complaint is filed and a school refuses to
change the Indian name, the state has the authority to intervene.'55
III. Analysis of Legal Efforts to End Indian Stereotypes
A. The Constitutional Approach
1. Equal Protection
Equality and equal respect are highly valued principles in our system of
jurisprudence. Three Constitutional provisions" and a myriad of federal
and state statutes are aimed at protecting the rights of racial, religious, and
sexual minorities to be free from discrimination in housing, education, jobs,
and many other areas of life.'57 Yet the equality principle is not without
limits. Rigorous rules of intent, causation, standing, and limiting relief
circumscribe what may be done.'' New causes of action are not lightly
recognized.'59
In El-Em Band of Pomo Indians of the Sulpher Bank Rancheria v. 49th
District Fair Ass'n"w Native Americans from a federal reservation in Lake
County, California, as well as several individual Native Americans living
in Lake County, filed a class action suit on behalf of themselves and all
Native Americans in California. The action arose from the use of an Indian
caricature, called "Him Konocti," in advertising and promotional materials
for the Lake County Fair. The cartoon caricature featured a feather
headdress and a profile with a prominent nose.
Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and
2000a-6 of the Civil Rights Act, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of
153. Wisconsin Rules on Nicknames, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 19, 1992, at 4A.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV.
157. See Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision,
85 Nw. U. L. REv. 343, 381 (1991).
158. See Richard Delgado, Derrik Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: WIll We Ever Be
Saved?, 97 YALE LJ. 923, 936 (1988).
159. For example, the legal system has resisted efforts by feminists to have pornography
deemed a civil rights offense against women. See American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut,
771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
160. 359 F. Supp. 1044 (1973).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol20/iss1/3
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the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. However, the
defendants removed all depictions of the name and image after this suit was
filed, making the sole remedy of injunctive relief under section 2000a-6
moot.' However, the claim under the antidiscrimination provision of
section 1983 remained.'" In addition, plaintiffs sought damages for
humiliation and ridicule caused by use of the Indian caricature in advertis-
ing promoting the fair."
To state a claim under section 1983, the plaintiffs had to show a
violation of some right guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United
States." The issue turned on whether the use of a racially derogatory
stereotype by a public entity violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, therefore constituting a claim for damages under
section 1983.Y Plaintiffs claimed that the cause of action was one of
racial discrimination, because defendant's use of the cartoon caricature
portrayed Indians as a subject of ridicule, bringing the claim to a constitu-
tional level."
Distinguishing the cases cited by plaintiffs to support the claim of
discrimination from the instant case, the district court stated that plaintiffs'
cited cases "all involve[d] a situation in which an identifiable group [was]
denied constitutionally protected rights and privileges accorded to other
groups."' 7 Therefore, the court held that use of an Indian caricature, even
if in fact derogatory, is not unconstitutional because it does not deny a
constitutionally protected right to a specific group." Merely because the
insults were racial, the court reasoned, did not make the rights constitution-
ally protected.'" Emphasizing that this was a matter of state concern, the
court reasoned that to find this right covered by section 1983 would be "an
161. El-Em Band, 359 F. Supp. at 1045 (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 409 F.2d 121,
126 (2nd Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 398 U.S. 144 (1971)).
162. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any...
person... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
163. El-Em Band, 359 F. Supp. at 1045.
164. Id. (citing Johnson v. Hackett, 284 F. Supp. 933, 939 n. 11 (E.D. Pa. 1968)).
165. Id. at 1045.
166. Id.
167. Id. The plaintiffs referred to: Gatson County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969);
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Kennedy Park
Homes Assn. v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669, 671 (W.D.N.Y.1970), affld., 436 F.2d
108, 109 (2 Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 1010 (1971).
168. Id. at 1045.
169. Id. (citing Johnson, supra note 164, at 940).
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unwarranted extension by the court of civil rights to include those individual
freedoms which heretofore have been matters of state concern.' 70 The
court found that the use of a racially defamatory stereotype in this situation
constituted libel.' However, plaintiffs specifically agreed in their memo-
randum to the court that defamation committed by persons acting under
color of law does not violate section 1983." Thus, the complaint failed
to state a claim under either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-6.'
The court's holding relied on Johnson v. Hackett,74 which involved
racially derogatory comments made by white police officers to a group of
black men.S The plaintiffs brought suit for deprivation of rights by the
police officers. Specifically, the action was based under the Civil Rights
Act of 1871.76 The complaint was dismissed because the police officers
170. Id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 44,45 (West 1995); CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 830-849
(West 1995)).
171. Libel is defined in California Civil Code § 45 as "a false and unprivileged publication
by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any
person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided,
or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation." Id.
172. Id. (citing Heller v. Roberts, 386 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967); Morey v. Independent School
District No. 492, 312 F. Supp. 1257, 1262 (D. Minn. 1969), affd, 429 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1970);
Sinchak v. Parente, 262 F. Supp. 79, 87 (W.D. Pa. 1966); Hopkins v. Wasson, 227 F. Supp. 278,
280 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), affd, 329 F.2d 67 (6th Cir. 1964), cert denied, 379 U.S. 854 (1964)).
173. Id.
174. Johnson v. Hackett, 284 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
175. The comments made included a statement that an officer "hated blackies," and the
expression "What's a dead nigger anyway?" The police officers eventually arrested Arien
Johnson, one of the men in the group, for "disorderly conduct." Id. at 936.
176. The Act of 1871 provides in pertinent part:
§ 1983: Civil action for deprivation of rights.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any ...
person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
§ 1985: Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights - Preventing officer from
performing duties.
If two or more persons ...conspire for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; ... if one or more
persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the
object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property,
or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery
of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of
the conspirators.
§ 1986: Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights - Action for neglect to
prevent officer from performing duties.
Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be




were not considered to be acting "under color of law."'" The court held
that neither the police officers' offer to fight the men, nor the racial slurs,
violated any right under the U.S. Constitution. 78  Further, the court
reasoned that the duty to protect rights such as "enjoy[ment of] integrity of
reputation and public right to tranquility" lies with the state, as well as
responsibility for "defining and punishing use in public places of words
likely to cause breach of peace."'79
The reasoning from Johnson, which was adopted by the court in El-Em
Band, could apply to the current stereotype controversy. Specifically, the
concept that "only limited protection is afforded the right to be free from
harmful expression."'" However, courts have yet to define and apply
"harmful expression" in this context. These cases also suggest that there
might be a state remedy in libel for some offensive images, possibly
including racial stereotypes.
2. The First Amendment
a) Offensive and Political Speech
The First Amendment protects speech which we agree and disagree
with."' Yet, such things as race-hatred speech implicate powerful social
interests in equality." In this area the United States Supreme Court has
balanced free speech with the equal-protection values endangered by race-
hate speech. In Beauharnais v. Illinois," the defendant was convicted
under a statute prohibiting dissemination of materials promoting racial or
religious hatred. Justice Frankfurter, citing the "fighting words" doctrine of
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire," ruled that libelous statements aimed at
groups, like those aimed at individuals, are not protected by the First
Amendment.' Though later decisions such as New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,' have increased protection for libelous speech, 7 Beauharnais
having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects
or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable... for all
damages caused by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence
could have prevented ....
Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, 15 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983-1986
(1988)).
177. Johnson, supra note 174, at 939.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 940.
181. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
182. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1609 (1986);
Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEx. L. REV. 381, 389 (1989).
183. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
184. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
185. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 257-58.
186. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that libel of public figures requires showing of actual
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has never been overruled. Many courts have also afforded redress in tort for
racially or sexually insulting language."
Additionally, there are dozens of "exceptions" to free speech. These
exceptions include: speech that constitutes "fighting words"; 9 speech used
to form a criminal conspiracy' or an ordinary contract; 9 words used
to communicate a criminal threat; n speech regarding an official secret;
speech that defames or libels someone;" speech that is obscene;
95
speech that creates a hostile workplace;' speech that violates a trademark
or plagiarizes another's words; speech that creates an immediately
harmful impact;'98 "patently offensive" speech directed at captive audienc-
es or broadcast on the airwaves; 99 speech that disrespects a judge, teacher,
military officer, or other authority figure;2  speech used to defraud a
consumer;20 1 words used in price fixing;2° and untruthful or irrelevant
speech given under oath or during a trial.2"
malice); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (overturning libel judgment won by
public official by analogizing case to seditious libel).
187. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-11, at 861 n,2
(2d ed. 1988) (citing Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916, 919 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari)).
188. See Delgado, supra note 157, at 377.
189. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
190. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
191. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974).
192. See ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 177-82, 448-52, 1113-
15 (3d ed. 1982).
193. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
194. See Beauharnals v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
195. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,
23 (1973) (mailing of unsolicited sexually explicit material not protected by First Amendment).
Indecent expression, however, is generally protected. See Sable Communications Inc. v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115, 124 (1989) (holding that sale of dial-a-porn messages to adults cannot be criminalized
because indecent).
196. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th
Cir. 1971).
197. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
198. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969); Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,
52 (1919).
199. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418
U.S. 298 (1974).
200. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918); see also Bethel School
Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). For federal protection of inanimate objects and symbols,
see 18 U.S.C. § 707 (1988) (4-H club symbol); 18 U.S.C. § 711 (1988) (Smokey the Bear); 18
U.S.C. § 71 la (1988) (Woodsey the Owl); 36 U.S.C. §§ 170-188 (1988) (U.S. flag).
201. See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 192, at 304-08.
202. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 29-30, 132-34 (1977).




At the opposite end of the spectrum is political speech which include
statements surrounding government action, major social and public policy
issues, and persons connected with such matters.2" Political speech is
given full First Amendment protection"5 because such expression is
considered the basis of the First Amendment.Y Other types of expression
are also entitled to First Amendment protection."° As the Supreme Court
has observed, "[O]ur cases have never suggested that expression about
philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters - to
take a nonexhaustive list of labels - is not entitled to full First Amendment
protection."' " s The Court has also stated that expression on matters of
"public concern" are covered as well."M In this case, writers, musicians
and commentators are entitled to rely on the Freedom of Speech or Press
Clauses regardless of whether the work is of a political nature."0 Thus,
offensiveness, without more, cannot serve as a constitutional basis for
imposing liability."'
The issue is whether the social interest in controlling racially offensive
speech is as great as that which gives rise to these "exceptional" categories,
and whether the use of racially offensive language has speech value."2
The First Amendment perspective yields no definite solution. Society has
a strong interest in seeing that expression is as free as possible, yet the kind
of expression under consideration has no great social worth and can cause
serious harm.
204. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404-05 (1989) (holding that flag burning may be
expressive action protected by first amendment); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56
(1988) (holding that first amendment requires that public figures and public officials prove "actual
malice" on behalf of publisher to recover for tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress);
First NatI Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-86 (1978) (holding that first amendment protects
speech made by corporate representatives on behalf of corporation criticizing proposed
legislation); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-71 (1964) (holding that first
amendment protects criticisms of public officials where no actual malice involved).
205. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 204, at 409-10.
206. Id.; Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,318 (1988) (holding that content-based restriction on
picketing in front of foreign embassy violative of First Amendment).
207. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557-58 (1975)
(theatrical production); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (issues of
public concern); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 417 (1966) (works of literature).
208. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977).
209. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-60 (1985).
210. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (parody concerning public figure);
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (magazine article about play); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (movie).
211. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
212. See Delgado, supra note 157, at 380.
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b) Commercial Speech
Not all constitutionally shielded speech receives the extensive protection
accorded political speech. Current constitutional interpretation indicates a
distinction between noncommercial speech, which is potentially entitled to
full protection, and commercial speech, which receives less than full
protection. Until 1976, speech classified as commercial was long regarded
as being outside the scope of the Freedom of Speech and Press clauses."3
In Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.," 4 the Supreme Court brought commercial speech under the First
Amendment umbrella but declined to give it the full protection accorded
political speech and its equivalents." 5 The test now establishes the degree
of constitutional protection for the subject speech."'
"Commercial speech" is usually defined by the Supreme Court as
expression that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction.""7
Advertising to sell a product is a common example. "' Sometimes,
however, the Court has broadened the definition of commercial speech to
include expression that is solely in the economic interest of the speaker and
the audience." This latter definition may allow the commercial speech
label to be assigned to certain speech that does more than merely propose
a commercial transaction.2" A speaker's expectation of profit from his
statements does not by itself make the expression commercial speech.2
If speech is to be classified as partially protected commercial speech or as
213. See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942) (noting that "the
Constitution imposes no ... restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising").
214. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
215. Id. at 771-72 n.24.
216. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818-22 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Comm'n
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1973). Compare Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (holding limited first amendment protection for
commercial speech) with Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (holding no First
Amendmnt protection for commercial speech).
217. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983); Virginia Bd.
of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762.
218. See, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986); Bolger, 463
U.S. 60 (1983); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980);
Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
219. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561.
220. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68 (finding commercial speech present even though
advertisements at issue contained some speech that did not propose commercial transaction); see
also Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979) (holding that trade name that does not by itself
seem to propose commercial transaction but does seem solely in economic interest of speaker and
audience is commercial speech).
221. See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657,667 (1989); City
of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750,756 n.5 (1988); Pittsburgh Press Co.,




wholly unprotected expression, factors other than the economic motivation
of the speaker must justify the classification.m Assuming, that speech
restricted by government action is properly classified as commercial, a court
charged with determining the validity of the government action must make
suitable allowances for the partially protected status of commercial
expression.
The Supreme Court's recognition of the public interest in the free flow
of commercial information was the basis for the holding in Virginia Board
of Pharmacy that commercial speech merits constitutional status.'
However, this protection extended to commercial speech was conditioned
on the expression's being truthful and about a lawful activity.2" Left
undermined were the specific means of implementing commercial speech's
partial First Amendment protection. That task was undertaken in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.' The
Central Hudson Court developed a four-part test for determining the
constitutionality of government action that restricts commercial speech.2"
The first element of the Central Hudson test asks whether the affected
commercial speech pertains to a lawful activity and is nonmisleading.227
If this question is answered negatively, there is no need to apply the
remaining parts of the test because the government action will not violate
the First Amendment.m If the question posed in the first part of the
Central Hudson test is answered affirmatively, the affected commercial
speech is entitled to First Amendment protection. However, the government
action may be upheld if it clears the hurdles posed by the remaining three
parts:229 (1) whether the government had a "substantial" underlying interest
222. Although the Supreme Court has been less than clear concerning what other factors
besides the mere existence of a profit motive are necessary in order for speech to be considered
commercial speech, the closer the speech comes to the sale of goods or services - as opposed
to the context of the "sale" of ideas, as in a newspaper, book, or movie - the more likely it is
that the speech will be considered commercial speech. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-68 (holding
that speech that contains some noncommercial aspects but is primarily advertising of
commercially sold product should be treated as commercial speech for first amendment purposes).
223. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763. The Virginia Board of Pharmacy Court
struck down a state regulation that effectively prohibited pharmacists from advertising the prices
they would charge for prescription drugs. Id. at 749-50, 752.
224. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270-73 (1964) (holding that falsity
of speech does not necessarily cause loss of first amendment protection); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that speech about unlawful activity protected by first
amendment unless speech is both directed to incite and likely to incite imminent lawless activity).
225. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
226. This test was designed to give substance to the partial First Amendment protection
contemplated by Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
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to further in taking the action; (2) whether the government action directly
advanced the underlying interest; and (3) whether the government action
was no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.20
A lessening of First Amendment protection was signaled in Board of
Trustees v. Fox.' In Fox, the Court focused on the final element of
Central Hudson's four-part test for determining whether government action
that restricts commercial speech violates the First Amendment.3 As
formulated in Central Hudson, the final element inquired whether the
government action was no more extensive than necessary to serve the
underlying government interest. Some of the Court's previous commercial
speech decisions seemed to indicate that this element effectively required
a "least restrictive means" analysis. 3 Writing for the Fox majority, Justice
Scalia stated that no such analysis was contemplated or required by Central
Hudson.' The majority reasoned that the references in prior decisions to
a least restrictive means approach were dicta because the Court had never
actually established that a government restriction on commercial speech
must be absolutely the narrowest means of furthering the underlying
government interest2' 5
In rejecting the least-restrictive means analysis, the Fox Court held that
the final element of the four-part test merely requires that when the
government regulates commercial speech, its means must be "narrowly
tailored to achieve [its] desired objective."'" Justice Scalia observed that
230. Id. In Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989), however, the Supreme Court
lessened the rigor of the fourth element of the Central Hudson test. The Court discarded Central
Hudson's "no more extensive than necessary" inquiry, substituting an inquiry as to whether the
government action was "narrowly tailored" to serve the underlying interest. Id. at 480. For
present purposes, however, it is sufficient to say that affirmative answers to each of the questions
posed in the last three elements of the four-part test would enable the government action to
withstand the first amendment challenge, whereas a negative answer to any of the three questions
would make the action unconstitutional.
231. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
232. JhL at 475-8 1. Fox dealt with a state university's regulation that restricted private parties
from holding "Tupperware parties" in students' dormitory rooms. Id. at 472. The student plaintiffs
alleged that the regulation unconstitutionally deprived them of their rights to receive commercial
speech. Id.
233. ld. at 475-81.
234. id. at 476-77.
235. i. at 478-80.
236. ld. at 480. The Fox trial court had ruled for the university, but the court of appeals
reversed and remanded because the trial court had not considered whether the university
regulation was the least restrictive means by which the university could further its substantial
interests in preserving an educational environment and in minimizing the risk that students would
be taken advantage of by unscrupulous merchants. Fox v. Board of Trustees, 841 F.2d 1207,
1213-14 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 492 U.S. 469 (1989). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded
because the court of appeals had erroneously required a "least restrictive means" analysis. Fox,




the Constitution mandated a "reasonable" fit, "not necessarily [a] perfect"
fit, between the regulation and the underlying government interest.237 After
Fox's reformulation of the Central Hudson test, a regulation that is more
extensive than necessary to serve an underlying government interest may
now pass First Amendment muster. Under Fox's "narrowly tailored"
approach, a restriction that sweeps more broadly than the narrowest possible
regulation may still be "reasonably" suited to the advancement of the
government interest."
Fox's definite lessening of the protection afforded by the commercial
speech test signifies that government restrictions on commercial speech will
be less likely to be struck down on First Amendment grounds than they
would have been under Central Hudson. Although the recent interpretation
of the commercial speech test translates into a lessening of the First
Amendment protection afforded commercial speech, the Fox Court failed to
acknowledge that it was effecting such a shift. Instead, the Court purported
merely to clarify the degree of scrutiny given to government action that
limits commercial speech. 9 Furthermore, the Court expressly denied that
Fox amounted to an adoption of a lenient "rational basis" test for determin-
ing the constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech.2'
Although Fox should not be regarded as having eliminated First
Amendment protection for commercial speech, it did lower commercial
speech protection to a level that is still "intermediate," yet farther removed
from the highest level of First Amendment protection. Political speech and
its noncommercial equivalents are reserved at the highest level. Fox signals
a widening of the gulf between the respective levels of First Amendment
protection for noncommercial and commercial speech and thus a potentially
higher chance of protecting Indians from offensive commercial speech such
as advertising that uses Indians or the nicknames and mascots of teams."M
237. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480.
238. See id. at 477-81.
239. See id. at 479-81.
240. Id. at 480. The rational basis test is often used to determine whether the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been violated by an economic regulation
that did not affect a suspect class or the exercise of a fundamental right. Under this test, an
economic regulation will be sustained if it is reasonably related to a legitimate government
purpose. The regulation will normally be upheld when this test applies because the
government can establish "reasonable relation" with ease. See JOHN E. NOWAK El" AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 530 (3d ed. 1986). Despite the Court's disavowal of the rational basis
test in Fox, the Court's focus on a "reasonable" fit between the regulation and the underlying
government interest seems akin to adopting a rational basis type of review. See Fox, 492 U.S.
at 480.
241. In Fox, Justice Scalia stated that the decision actually strengthened "the essential
protections of the First Amendment" by confirming that a meaningful distinction was kept
between fully protected noncommercial speech and less-valued commercial speech. See Fox, 492
U.S. at 481. The Court's recent endorsements of noncommercial (as opposed to commercial)
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c) Commercial Speech and Trademark Law
With regard to First Amendment protection to trademarks, there is
limited protection. In Friedman v. Rogers, the Supreme Court has held that
trademarks do not receive an unlimited amount of First Amendment
protection.u2 Trademarks are purely commercial speech: there is no intent
to communicate an idea apart from solicitation for a commercial transaction
and any associations which have developed from the name can be expressed
directly.U3
The decision in Central Hudson'" suggests that discriminatory commer-
cial spech does not receive any First Amendment protection. The case
mentioned that the government can ban commercial speech which relates to
illegal activity. It then explained that in order for commercial speech to
receive First Amendment protection, it must concern lawful activity.245
Thus taken together, it is possible to draw the conclusion that the First
Amendment protection given to a trademark which caused discrimination
would be minimal.
d) Application of the First Amendment to Native Americans
The various complaints filed by Native Americans using the First
Amendment and commercial speech issues share a pattern similar to
complaints filed in the late 1970s by African Americans against the
"Sambo's Restaurant" chain.' In interpreting the Supreme Court's
opinions, some of the negative images of Native Americans may themselves
be constitutionally protected under First Amendment. In the 1981 decision,
Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 7 a restaurant owner
sought declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged constitutional violations.
The court held that using the name "Sambo's"24" for a restaurant, although
perhaps offensive to African Americans, was commercial speech protected
speech highlight this distinction. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Hustler Magazine
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
242. 440 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979).
243. Id.
244. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
245. Id. at 563-64.
246. See generally Sambo's of Ohio, Inc. v. City Council of Toledo, 466 F. Supp. 177 (N.D.
Ohio 1979); Sambo's of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Smith, C.A. No. 78-5490 (Middlesex County,
Mass. Super. Ct. 1979).
247. 663 F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1981).
248. The restaurant logo is derived from The Story of Little Black Sambo, which was written
in 1899. It is a narrative describing the adventures of Little Black Sambo, who loses his red coat,
blue trousers, purple shoes and green umbrella to a group of tigers. The tigers fight over the
clothes and run around and around a tree, turning themselves into a pool of butter. Little Black




under the First Amendment, where [the] city had produced no evidence to
demonstrate that the operation of the restaurant under such name had
retarded or impeded achievement or furtherance of its goal of racial
equality.'" 9 The district court considered the substantial financial invest-
ments made to advertise the Sambo's logo, as well as the goodwill
associated with the image." Money invested in advertising and the
goodwill value of logos would most likely be factors considered by the
court if a similar question arose within the context of Indian stereotypes
used for commercial purposes, such as professional sports team logos and
names, as well as the wide range of products sold to fans.
In In re The Urban League of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Sambo's of Rhode
Island, Inc., ' "Sambo's" was ordered to cease commercial use of the
name because the "Sambo's" trademark denied African American citizens
full and equal accommodations, due to the offensive nature of the trademark
to African Americans and its subsequent deterrence factor. This case
involved complaints filed with the Rhode Island Commission for Human
Rights against "Sambo's of Rhode Island" alleging, among other charges,
that "Sambo's" violated the Rhode Island Public Accommodations Act.'
Many of the witnesses brought before the commission alleged that they
believed the "Sambo's" logo was offensive to them (African Americans)Y3
Several witnesses described examples of prejudice which occurred in school
after the "Sambo" story was told.' Many witnesses also testified that
249. Id. at 695.
250. Id. at 687.
251. File Nos. 79 PRA 074-06/06,79 ERA 073-06/06, EEOC No. 011790461 (R.I. Comm'n
for Human Rights 1981) [hereinafter Urban League of Rhode Island].
252. Hotels and Public Places, R.I. GEN. LAws § 11, ch. 24 (1956). This act ensures that
"[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the state shall be entitled to full and equal ac-
comodations ..... Id. § 11-24-I. In this case, the use of the name "Sambo's" resulted in an
indirect refusal, withholding and denial of the accommodation facilities and privileges of
respondent's places of public accommodation to black persons because of their race. Such
advertising had the effect of notifying black persons that the accomodations, advantages,
facilities and privileges of respondent's places of public accommodation would be denied to
them because of their race. Many blacks considered it a deterrent to patronage. See also Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
253. The Story of Little Black Sambo was written and drawn about 100 years ago by the
English writer, Helen Bannerman. The pictures show a black child wearing multicolored clothes
and having encounters with tigers. Urban League of Rhode Island, supra note 251, at para. 6.
Most of the witnesses read the book when they were in grade school. All of the black American
witnesses who read the book stated that they found the book to be offensive. Id. at para. 7.
Several of the witnesses testified that they were offended by the reaction which the book inspired
in whites. Id.
254. Many of the witnesses testified that when the story was read to the class in school, the
white students would make fun of the black students (including the witnesses). 1 Transcript, June
30, 1980, at 97, Urban League of Rhode Island; 2 Transcript, July 1, 1980, at 85, 86, 163, Urban
League of Rhode Island.
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"Sambo" brought to mind an offensive stereotype,2 5 and an image of
slavery."
More than two-thirds of the African Americans who testified has been
called a "Sambo" or had been present when another African American was
called a "Sambo."' The name-calling was always done in a derogatory
manner." One witness testified that when he entered the restaurant, he
was verbally accosted. 9
Sambo's management knew the name offended a significant percentage
of African Americans in the area." It was also aware that the name was
recognized by the Attorney General of Massachusetts as being offensive to
the African American people of Massachusetts.26 Sambo's could not prove
that its name was necessary for the safe and efficient operation of its
business.' z
One of the issues that arose in this case was whether the First Amend-
mentae protected the owner of an offensive trademark. The Commission
concluded that the First Amendment to the Constitution did not prohibit it
from ordering Sambo's to stop using that name for it's restaurant when it
violated the Public Accommodations Act.21 In holding that the First
Amendment did not prevent all regulation of speech, the Commission said
that an action can violate a statute even if it involves speech, saying "it has
never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make
a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated,
evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written or
255. One witness stated that the word evoked a stereotype of
black people having certain features and black - certain features which at the
time might develop when I was a kid having a big nose and thick lips, and nappy
hair, such as I have now, you weren't so beautiful, but now I'm beautiful, that
came about, but there is the fact that those kinds of images with the smiling face
and the kind of running around half-scatterbrained was really a negative - is
really a negative kind of an image of black people.
2 Transcript, July 1, 1980, at 109, Urban League of Rhode Island.
256. li. at 159.
257. Urban League of Rhode Island, supra note 251, at para. 10.
258. li.
259. A witness testified that in November 1979, after discussion with friends, they entered
a Sambo's because it was the only place open at that hour. 1 Transcript, June 30, 1980, at 191-93,
Urban League of Rhode Island. He testified that as he and his friends sat down, one of the other
patrons said, "They'll let anybody in here," and another patron said, "Well, what do you expect,
it's a Sambo's." Another patron said, "I'd like to shoot 'em, I'd like to shoot all of them." Id. at
194.
260. Urban League of Rhode Island, supra note 251, at para. 15.
261. 1 Transcript, June 30, 1980, at 146, Urban League of Rhode Island.
262. Urban League of Rhode Island, supra note 251, at para. 16.
263. A-1 at pt. C.




printed.""26 Courts have also held that speech can be enjoined if the speech
constitutes or promotes an illegal action.'
To determine whether the First Amendment prohibited regulation of
particular language, the Commission weighed the First Amendment interest
in free speech against the public interest in regulating the speech.267
According to this Commission, the weight of the First Amendment interest
in free speech varied with the type of speech involved. Political speech
merited a great deal of First Amendment protection; commercial speech
received a limited amount of First Amendment protection.2n
With regard to First Amendment protection to trademarks, there is
limited protection. The Commission cited the Supreme Court's holding in
Friedman that trademarks do not receive a large amount of First Amend-
ment protection.269 Trademarks, concluded the Commission were purely
commercial speech, there was no intent to communicate an idea apart from
solicitation for a commercial transaction and any associations which have
developed from the name can be expressed directly.' In the Urban
League case, the restaurant said it used the name "Sambo's" to tell the
public that "good wholesome food served at reasonable prices in a family
atmosphere" could be obtained at its restaurants.27' The Commission felt
that "Sambo's" could have conveyed this message without the "Sambo's"
name.2" Thus, according to the criteria developed in Friedman, the First
Amendment protection afforded to the trademark of "Sambo's" was
limited. 3 Using the Supreme Court's holding in Central Hudson, the
Commission held further that discriminatory commercial speech did not
receive any First Amendment protection.274 The case mentioned that the
265. Id.; see Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949); see also
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (holding that state may regulate a
lawyer's conduct in soliciting clients even though such regulation entails regulation of speech.).
266. Urban League of Rhode Island, supra note 251, at pt. C; see National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). In Professional Eng'ers, a district court
had found that a society's canon of ethics which forbade competitive bidding violated the
Sherman Antitrust Act. The court's order required the society to refrain from adopting any official
opinion, policy, statement or guideline stating or implying that competitive bidding was unethical.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the district court did not violate the First Amendment as the
order was a reasonable method of eliminating the consequences of the illegal conduct. Id. at 698.
267. Urban League of Rhode Island, supra note 251, at pt. D; see Bigelow v. Virginia, 421
U.S. 809 (1975).
268. Urban League of Rhode Island, supra note 251, at pt. D; see Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456.
See supra notes 213-45 and accompanying text.
269. Urban League of Rhode Island, supra note 251, at pt. D (citing Friedman v. Rogers,
440 U.S. 1, 16 (1979)).
270. Id.
271. Memorandum in Support of Respondents Motion to Dismiss at 3, Urban League of
Rhode Island.
272. Urban League of Rhode Island, supra note 251, at pt. C.
273. Id.
274. Id. at pt. D (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
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government may ban commercial speech which relates to illegal activity
including discriminatory speech."' It then explained that in order for
commercial speech to receive First Amendment protection, it must concern
lawful activity."6
The Commission in the Urban League case decided that the public
interest in preventing an illegal act of racial discrimination justified
regulation of the name "Sambo's." The Supreme Court has held that the
public interest in regulating speech which is misleading or untruthful
outweighs the First Amendment interest in protecting free use of trade-
marks.2" The interest in preventing discrimination is as important a public
interest as the prohibition of deceptive speech. The Commission also cited
the Supreme Court's dealing with the weight of the public interest in
preventing discrimination in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Commission on Human
Relations. 8 This case indicated the court's movement from the doctrine
that purely commercial speech receives no First Amendment protection in
Valentine v. Chrestensen"' to the current doctrine that commercial speech
receives a limited amount of First Amendment protection."' In Pittsburgh
Press,"' the Supreme Court held that the public interest in preventing an
illegal discriminatory act (publishing job opportunities by sex) outweighed
the respondent's claim to First Amendment protection. Thus, the Supreme
Court has held that the public interest in preventing illegal acts of
discrimination is sufficient to outweigh the First Amendment protection
given to commercial speech.2"
566 (1980)).
275. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
276. Id. at 563-64. See supra notes 213-45 and accompanying text.
277. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
278. 4.13 U.S. 376 (1973).
279. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
280. Friedman, 440 U.S. at 9.
281. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
282. Sambo's tried to counter this theory by offering Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977), in which the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance which
prohibited the use of "for sale" signs on residential property even though the town claimed that
the ordinance was designed to prevent "white flight" and promote integration. That case was
distinguishable on two major grounds. First, the town did not prove that it had a problem with
'white flight" or that the ordinance would prevent the problem if it existed. Id. at 95, 96. Second,
the informtion conveyed, the availability of homes for sale, did not constitute or promote illegal
racial discrimination. Id. at 97. In the Sambo's case, the complainants proved that the name
caused racial discrimination in public accommodations so that the language was prohibited only
after it was proved that it caused harm. Id. Two other cases, Sambo's of Ohio, Inc v. City
Council of Toledo, 466 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1979), and Sambo's of Massachusetts, Inc. v.
Smith, C.A. No. 78-5490 (Middlesex County, Mass. Super. Ct. 1979), were rejected as well.
These cases concerned the denial of a license or permit to Sambo's because the names were
offensive. These courts held that the First Amendment prohibited regulation of speech when the





From the above analysis, it is possible to construct an argument for
Native Americans seeking to remove athletic team mascots and symbols.
If we assume that a team mascot or symbol is a trademark of some type,
then an argument could be made along the lines of Sambo's of Rhode Island
that preventing illegal acts of discrimination is sufficient to outweigh what
little First Amendment protection is given to commercial speech. In this
case, the deep-seated goal of society to stamp out discrimination. While the
Equal Protection Clause would argue for a tough standard for enforcement,
subsequent cases such as Fox would appear to make the Native American's
case easier to win in that commercial speech protection under the First
Amendment in Fox was so limited. Assuming a mascot is proven to be
racist or discriminatory, Central Hudson offers a solution in that if the
mascot or symbol is discriminatory, it represents illegal commercial speech
and thus the athletic team would lose its protection. Additionally, the Public
Accommodations Act covers sports events at a stadium, so application of
a Federal law to protect a person's civil rights would apply without
question. Many of the above-mentioned protests are at municipal stadiums.
Other potential problems arise when the stadium is privately owned and
operated.
The main problem lies in (1) making the connection that the mascot or
symbol is the team trademark and (2) if so, determining whether the mascot
or symbol is offensive to a few "sensitive" people or to all who see it. The
Sambo's of Rhode Island decision seemed to side with a fair majority of
African Americans who found the term "Sambo's" offensive and racist.2"
As for Native Americans and White Americans, terms such as "Braves" and
"Chiefs" do not readily conjure up ideas of Sambo-type images. To a large
extent, such terms are honorable by themselves as many of the team owners
have argued. The question then becomes whether the peripheral conditions
surrounding the names constitute a substitute for the name being less than
offensive? For example, Cleveland calls its team the "Indians" (recognizing
Columbus's misnomer for Native Americans) and that alone is not generally
offensive. However, "Chief Wahoo" (the Indian's mascot on ballcaps) and
case, the complainants proved that the name caused racial discrimination in public accommoda-
tions in violation of Rhode Island law. Hotels and Public Places, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11, ch. 24
(1956). The public interest in the enforcement of statutes prohibiting racial discrimination requires
more consideration than the public interest in avoiding language which will offend a section of
society.
283. Not all Indian groups, however, support AIM. The Eastern Band Cherokees
manufacture rubber tomahawks, spears, moccasins, bows and arrows and drums, all of whichare
sold as sports souvenirs. Chief Johnathan Ed Taylor said, "We believe in economic development.
We're not standing in line at the BIA [Bureau of Indian Affairs] wanting a handout. I think we
can still keep our identity and live, too." Anne Gowen, Taking AIM at Emblems: Indian Group
on Offense Against Teams that Sport Ethnic Names, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1992, at El.
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his big nose and toothy grin represent the team. Additionally, at just about
every stadium mentioned above there is a common tradition to dress up,
swing an arm or ax and chant. Vernon Bellecourt, cofounder of the
American Indian Movement, has argued along the same lines that such
names are offensive to Native Americans because they are the stimulus for
offensive stereotype characters and behavior.'" But do these events justify
denial of a trademark? A valid argument also exists that the term "Red-
skins" is equivalent to "Negro" or "Nigger" in degree of offensiveness
(describing a physical trait to separate from the norm rather than a human
title of honor) and could therefore pass muster if challenged along the lines
of Sambo.
B. Legislative Action
1. Using Indian Stereotypes to Sell Products
In March 1992,"5 a caricature of the revered Oglala Sioux leader, Chief
Crazy Horse, appeared on the label for a new brand of malt liquor bearing
his name.' This marketing campaign clearly targeted Native Ameri-
cans, 2 7 adding a new dimension to the stereotypical image debate. The
fact that the products marketed are clearly hazardous to health differentiates
this use of a Native American stereotype, making the risk of permanent
harm even greater. The forty-ounce bottle, marketed by Hornell Brewing
Company, bears a label depicting ancient medicine symbols and a profile
of an Indian warrior in a headdress. 8 An advertisement describing
imagery of the Wild West frontier and encouraging consumers to drink
Crazy Horse characterized the advertising campaign, as well as appeared on
the label.'
284. Chief Wahoo Under Attack, UPI, Sept. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Sports File. Bellecourt believes that because of the names, Native Americans are singled out for
ridicule when fans pretend to tomahawk an opponent with one hand while holding a beer in the
other, and that if a stereotype demeaning to another race was utilized people would not stand for
it. Id.
285. James Bovard, The Second Murder of Crazy Horse, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 1992, at
A16.
286. LeMay, supra note 45, at Al.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. The label stated:
The Black Hills of Dakota, steeped in the history of the American West, home
of proud Indian Nations, a land where imagination conjures up images of blue-clad
Pony Soldiers and magnificent Native American warriors. A land still rutted with
wagon tracks of intrepid pioneers. A land where wailful winds whisper of Sitting
Bull, Crazy Horse, and Custer. A land of character, of bravery, of tradition. A land




The Surgeon General requested that the company discontinue the label
and change the bottle size, citing a concern about alcoholism within the
Indian community.2" They emphasized evidence that this type of adver-
tising links alcohol to Indian culture and religious tradition. 9' Studies
indicate that the incidence of alcoholism among Native Americans,
compared to the population at large, is very high.2" A large percentage of
Native Americans die before age forty-five,293 with at least four of the six
major causes of death linked to alcohol use.2"
The six main causes of death among Native Americans are unintentional
injuries, cirrhosis, homicide, suicide, pneumonia, and complications related
to diabetes.29 Unintentional injuries are the leading cause of death for men
younger than forty-five, and the second leading cause of death overall."6
A total of 75% of these injuries are alcohol-related, and 54% involve motor
vehicle accidents.2' Alcohol also~plays a role in the homicide rate, which
is 60% higher than the average for the general United States population.9
The overall suicide rate for Native Americans is 28% higher than the
national average, with rates among some tribes much higher than this.2"
Cirrhosis and diabetes rates, both noticeably higher among Native Ameri-
cans than other Americans, are also closely tied to alcohol abuse."
Alcohol is clearly a major health risk for the Native American popula-
tion. One study estimates that 95% of Native American families are
affected by a family member's alcohol abuse."' In addition to the alcohol-
related injuries and illnesses mentioned above, the incidence of Fetal
Alcohol Syndrome for Native Americans ranges up to thirty times the
national average."° The Crazy Horse controversy illustrates the negative
impact stereotypes can have on an ethnic group.
290. H.R. 5488, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). See infra note 299 (statistics on alcoholism
among Indian people).
291. Id.
292. See generally C.C. Lugan, Alcohol-Related Death of American Indians, 267 JAMA
1384 (Mar. 11, 1992).
293. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., PUB. No. (PHS) 91-50213, HEALTHY PEOPLE
2000: NATIONAL HEALTH PROMOTION AND DISEASE PREVENTION 38 (1990) (citing INDIAN
HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., TRENDS IN INDIAN HEALTH (1989)).
294. I U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE
ON BLACK AND MINORITY HEALTH 132-33 (1985) (Executive Summary).
295. Id.
296. Id. at 132.
297. Id. at 132-33.
298. See id. at 160.
299. Id. at 161.
300. M.P. Laplant, Data on Disability, NATIONAL HEALTH INTERIM SURVEY 1983-1985, at
10-11 (Nat'i Inst. on Disability & Rehabilitation Research 1988).
301. Antonia C. Novello, Crazy Horse Malt Liquor Beverage: The Public Outcry to Save
the Image of a Native American Hero, 38 S.D. L. REV. 14, 14 (1993).
302. Id.
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1995
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
Although significant progress has been made in combatting alcoholism
and related health problems among Native Americans, negative stereotypes
reinforce these problems, creating a vicious cycle. In a recent issue of the
Journal of the American Medical Association, Dr. Carol Lugan of Arizona
State University, noted that stereotypes perpetuate alcohol-related problems
among Native Americans.3" "[G]eneralized drinking patterns . . . re-
enforce negative stereotypes and can have the unintended impact of
promoting excessive drinking among Indians."3" Dr. Lugan argues that
many Native Americans lack the knowledge to evaluate the validity of these
negative stereotypes, and accept them as true."03
Motivated by documented health problems and the correlation to negative
Indian stereotypes, Congressional leaders joined the Surgeon General and
Indian groups in opposing the sale of Crazy Horse Malt Liquor."° They
urged the sale be discontinued on the gound that "[t]o accept this product,
which makes a stronger linkage to a widely respected cultural symbol than
past marketing schemes using Indian names,3" is to simply encourage a
mental association between alcohol and Indian culture - an association that
can only continue to harm the Native American community.' 08
Rep. Frank Wolf (R.-Va.) introduced an amendment to a House ap-
propriations bill prohibiting any company from naming any alcoholic
beverage after any person who was deceased." The amendment did not
prohibit derogatory stereotypes of any particular ethnic group, but focused
on preventing deceased people from being portrayed in a degrading
manner."' This bill sparked a movement that eventually led to the ban
preventing the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms from
approving any additional Crazy Horse labels.31 '
303. Lugan, supra note 292, at 1384.
304. Id.
305. Id
306. Then-Rep. Ben Nighthorse Campbell (D-Colo., now a Republican U.S. Senator), Rep.
Frank Wolf (R.-Va.), and Rep. Pat Schroeder (D.-Colo.) were key figures in defeating the sale
of Crazy Horse. 138 CONG. REc. S16,087 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1992).
307. Other alcoholic beverages named after Indians include "Thunderbird" wine and "Chief
Oshkosh" lager. Antonia C. Novello, Crazy Horse Malt Liquor Beverage: The Public Outcry to
Save the Image of a Native American Hero, 38 S.D. L. REV. 14, 16 (1993).
308. Id. at 14.
309. 138 CONG. REC. H5769 (daily ed. July 1, 1992) (statement of Rep. Wolf); see also
Dennis Gale, Crazy Horse Bill Passes House, RAPID CITY J. (Rapid City, S.D.), July 10, 1992,
at A5. "The original amendment said the government could keep alcoholic beverage companies
from using the names or likenesses of deceased people in a degrading or disparaging way." Id.
310. Id. at H5769.
311. 138 CONG. REC. H9586 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1992). Specifically, the bill denied funds
from the act "for approval of any certificate of label approval which authorizes the use of the
name Crazy Horse on any distilled spirit, wine or malt beverage product." Id.
[Vol. 20
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol20/iss1/3
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Negotiations attempted between the manufacturers of Crazy Horse Malt
Liquor and the Oglala Sioux Tribe failed to elicit a compromise concerning
voluntary withdrawal of the product or replacement of the label."2 As a
result, Sen. Tom Daschle (D.-S.D.) proposed another amendment to the
appropriation bill, which was adopted by the Senate on September 10,
1992."' The House then passed the Senate amendment, and it became part
of Public Law 102-393 on October 6, 1992.2"4 The simple purpose of the
amendment was to ban the Crazy Horse label.
Hornell Brewing Company challenged the constitutionality of the law in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
31 5
Plaintiffs claimed that the law suppressed free speech in violation of the
First Amendment and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, as well as other constitutional violations.36 A report issued
on February 5, 1993, granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the
First Amendment challenge and to the government on all other claims."7
The court reasoned that although the government had shown a "substantial
interest in protecting the health of Native Americans, the evidence failed to
prove that the ban on Crazy Horse labels advanced that interest.
3
However, the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress
prepared a memorandum in response to the First Amendment challenge and
the magistrate's recommendation, stating that the ban did not violate the
First Amendment. 3 9 The memo suggested that the United States Supreme
312. 138 CONG. REC. S13,235 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1992).
313. H.R. 5488, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1992). The amendment read:
Upon the date of enactment of this Act, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms (ATF) shall deny any application for a certificate of label approval,
including a certificate of label approval already issued, which authorizes the use
of the name Crazy Horse on any distilled spirit, wine, or malt beverage product:
Provided, that no funds appropriated under this Act or any other Act shall be
expended by ATF for enforcement of this section and regulations thereunder, as
it relates to malt beverage glass bottles to which labels have permanently affixed
by means of painting or heat treatment, which were ordered on or before
September 15, 1992, or which are owned for resale by wholesalers or retailers.
Id.
314. Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub. L.
No. 102-393, § 633, 106 Stat. 1729, 1777 (1992). Novello, supra note 301, at 14.
315. Hornell Brewing Co., Inc. v. Brady, 819 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. N.Y. 1993).
316. Plaintiffs also claimed the law violated the principles of separation of powers,
constituted a deprivation of property without due process of law and without just compensation,
and constituted a bill of attainder. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 1236. See also Konnie LeMay, Crazy Horse Marketer Goes to Court, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY, Jan. 28, 1993, at Al.
319. Memorandum from Henry Cohen, Legislative Attorney, Congressional Research
Service, Library of Congress, to Sen. Tom Daschle at 7 (Feb. 16, 1993) (discussing Hornell
Brewing challenges to the statute), cited in Novello, supra note 301, at 14. The memorandum
states:
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Court would probably not consider the name "Crazy Horse" to be protected
commercial speech under the First Amendment. 2 Thus the court would
not use a heightened standard of review and the government could justify
the ban by showing a "legitimate reason" it should be passed.32' Therefore,
the district court could find in favor of the government on the First
Amendment issue.3" The final result in this action will indicate whether
this type of legislation will be one among successful methods to combat
negative stereotypes in the future.
The Crazy Horse legislation illustrates what can be accomplished when
legislatures respond to concerns about negative stereotypes. In the words of
Antonia C. Novella, Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, "We
must tell the alcohol industry and their highly paid marketeers that we have
had enough disease, enough disability, enough addiction, and enough death.
We must not let a proud Indian Nation be brought to its knees by alcohol-
ism and other health problems."" However, the Crazy Horse legislation
was very fact specific. If any change in these negative images is to be made
through legislative efforts, much broader legislation is needed. The causal
relationship between negative images and other Native American health
problems is becoming better defined, and similar changes are needed in
many areas including literature, children's toys, television and print
advertising, and motion pictures.
2. Public Accomodations
Sen. (then Rep.) Ben Nighthorse Campbell has introduced a bill to block
construction of a new stadium for the Washington Redskins until the team
changes its name.324 The proposed $206 million, 80,000-seat stadium
would be constructed on federal land adjacent to RFK Stadium." By
blocking the federal land transfer, Congress could force Redskins owner
Jack Kent Cooke to choose a new name in order to build the new stadi-
um.3" Senator Campbell introduced Senate Bill 1207,32' "to amend the
[T]his case could go either way. Because of the lack of elaboration in the
summary of the magistrates recommendation, it is difficult to evaluate his opinion
that banning the use of the "Crazy Horse" label violates the First Amendment. It
does appear, however, that a fairly strong case can be made that a ban does not





323. Novello, supra note 301, at 18.
324. NFL Notes Say Redskins Say Nickname is Positive, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 24, 199 1, at D2.
325. Id.
326. Ruben Casteneda, Protestors Condemn Redskins Name, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1993, at
C5.




District of Columbia Stadium Act of 1957 to authorize the construction,
maintenance, and operation of a new stadium in the District of Columbia,
and for other purposes," on June 30, 1993. It has now been referred to
the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. The bill reads in pertinent
part:
SECTION 3: PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF CERTAIN
DESIGNATIONS.
The District of Columbia is prohibited from allowing the
stadium constructed pursuant to section 2 to be used by any
person or organization exploiting any racial or ethnic group or
using nomenclature that includes a reference to real or alleged
physical characteristics of Native Americans or other group of
human beings."9
If Senator Campbell's bill succeeds, it will be a major accomplishment
for opponents of Indian mascots, logos and other stereotypical images. Even
though the bill is limited in scope, it could be a sign of a new approach to
eliminating derogatory images. Broader legislation of this type could greatly
restrict the use of derogatory Native American images, and force commer-
cially motivated organizations to reweigh the profit gained from using these
stereotypes.
Conclusion
Protests, as well as education, legal action, and legislation, can make a
difference in the fight to correct negative Indian stereotypes. The first step
is to increase awareness of the significant consequences related to negative
racial stereotypes. Protests and educational efforts by groups such as the
American Indian Movement (AIM) and the Concerned Indian Parents, as
well as action by Wisconsin Attorney General James Doyle, the Minnesota
Civil Liberties Union, and the Michigan Commission on Civil Rights are
steps in the right direction.
These efforts are evidence of the trend across the United States to replace
discriminatory stereotypes used as mascots, logos, or nicknames. The action
of the Wisconsin Attorney General, allowing the state to enforce restrictions
if necessary, is an important step because it gives additional clout to the
recommendation. This ensures that these stereotypes will not be perpetuated
in the Wisconsin public school system; and could prompt reforms in other
states. Michael Haney's complaint to the Missouri Commission on Human
Rights also indicates a new approach in the struggle to eliminate Indian
stereotypes, particularly sports mascots. However, public awareness and
328. Id. at pmbl.
329. Id. § 3.
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participation by Native Americans and others must be increased to make a
noticeable impact with these complaints.
With First Amendment protection specifically applicable to commercial
speech, and the lack of a specific right denied Native Americans, constitu-
tional arguments have not fully emerged as a valid solution to the problem
of discriminatory Indian stereotypes. Other legal remedies such as
individual complaints filed with civil rights organizations and possible
defamation actions hold more promise, but can vary greatly from state to
state. There is sufficient case law to conclude that Native Americans could
be successful at removing offensive mascots and symbols of athletic teams.
The question remains as to whether certain Native American terms are
offensive. Unlike "Sambo," there are arguments both for and against such
use, even if the word itself is not offensive. The peripheral actions can be
just as damaging as an offensive word. Thus part of the solution rests back
with the perception the rest of America has towards Native Americans and
the need for respect for Native cultures.
The enormous commercial incentives to rely on these discriminatory.
images must not be ignored. Public boycotts of these products could make
the lucrative financial rewards tied to the exploitation of Indian stereotypes
much less attractive. Legislation must also play a role. Specific legislation
broad enough to reach more than just the Redskins or the producers of
Crazy Horse Malt Liquor is needed. Realistically, the proposal must be
gradual and involve a time frame in which to change the advertising and
promotional strategies of the companies involved.
Eventually, the use of derogatory American Indian stereotypes, whether
to sell liquor, promote sports teams or advertise county fairs, must be made
less profitable and therefore less attractive to advertisers, school boards,
textbook publishers and the business community at large. The legislature
has the power to mandate this change. Educational efforts, protests and legal
action help to demonstrate that these images must be eliminated, and that
the public supports this change.
Negative Indian stereotypes can become a thing of the past. The efforts
of activists such as Michael Haney are proof. Evidence of progress is
documented each time a school changes a nickname or an editorial
denounces the Redskins. A new generation of Americans does not have to
perpetuate this discrimination. They should serve as examples to those
Americans who still think Indian nicknames are a "compliment." To
Cheyenne Stansberry,33 a five-year-old with blonde hair and blue eyes,
whose mother teaches in the Red Rock School District,33" ' Indians are the
people she plays with and sees every day. When she saw stereotypical
330. Cheyenne was named after the Wyoming town where her parents married, not the
Indian tribe.
331. Red Rocks school population is more than 50% Native American.
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Native Americans in quasi-ceremonial dress on television, she was quick to
exclaim, "Mommy, those aren't Indians!" Cheyenne knows the truth. Indians
are not cartoon characters, mascots, storybook figures, or historical relics.
They are real people, and they are alive and well.
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